Privacy-Preserving Multi-Quality Charging in V2G network by He, Miao
Privacy-Preserving Multi-Quality
Charging in V2G network
by
Miao He
A thesis
presented to the University of Waterloo
in fulfillment of the
thesis requirement for the degree of
Master of Applied Science
in
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2014
c© Miao He 2014
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis,
including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.
I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
ii
Abstract
Vehicle-to-grid (V2G) network, which provides electricity charging service to the elec-
tric vehicles (EVs), is an essential part of the smart grid (SG). It can not only effectively
reduce the greenhouse gas emission but also significantly enhance the efficiency of the power
grid. Due to the limitation of the local electricity resource, the quality of charging service
can be hardly guaranteed for every EV in V2G network. To this end, the multi-quality
charging is introduced to provide quality-guaranteed service (QGS) to the qualified EVs
and best effort service (BES) to the other EVs. To perform the multi-quality charging,
the evaluation on the EV’s attributes is necessary to determine which level of charging
service can be offered to the EV. However, the EV owner’s privacy such as real identity,
lifestyle, location, and sensitive information in the attributes may be violated during the
evaluation and authentication. In this thesis, a privacy-preserving multi-quality charging
(PMQC) scheme for V2G network is proposed to evaluate the EV’s attributes, authenticate
its service eligibility and generate its bill without revealing the EV’s private information.
Specifically, by adopting ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption (CP-ABE), the EV
can be evaluated to have proper charging service without disclosing its attribute privacy.
By utilizing group signature, the EV’s real identity is kept confidential during the authen-
tication and the bill generation. By hiding the EV’s real identity, the EV owner’s lifestyle
privacy and location privacy are also preserved. Security analysis demonstrates that P-
MQC can achieve the EV’s privacy preservation, fine-grained access control on the EVs
for QGS, traceability of the EV’s real identity and secure revocation on the EV’s service
eligibility. Performance evaluation result shows that PMQC can achieve higher efficiency
in authentication and verification compared with other schemes in terms of computation
overhead. Based on PMQC, the EV’s computation overhead and storage overhead can
be further reduced in the extended privacy-preserving multi-quality charging (ePMQC)
scheme.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
At the beginning of the 21st century, US National Academy of Engineering had a debate to
identify the most important single engineering achievement of the 20th century. While the
revolutionary internet just ranking the thirteenth, the top one was the power grid, which
was regarded as the most significant engineering achievement of the 20th century. The
power grid is the largest interconnected machine on Earth. It consists of more than 9,200
electric generators and 300,000 miles of transmission lines. The total generating capacity of
the power grid is more than 1,000,000 megawatts[4]. The power grid is linked with human’s
economy and society so tightly that everyone’s life and work can be hardly independent
of it. However, very few changes have taken place on the power grid system since its first
scalable deployment in late 19th century. If Alexander Graham Bell and Thomas Edison
were both transported to the 21st century, while Bell can hardly recognize the modern
communication technology such as cell phone and voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP),
Edison should be quite familiar with current power grid. Even though the power grid
has been operated and maintained by dedicated professionals for decades, it is the truth
that the power grid is becoming more and more heavily overburdened. According the
statistic data from U.S. Department of Energy, the growth in peak demand for electricity
has exceeded the transmission growth by almost 25% every year since 1982, due to the fast
population growth and the rapid increasing number of household appliances[4]. Massive
blackout occurs more and more frequently. Northeast blackout of 2003 affected 55 million
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people[5]. 2005 Java-Bali blackout affected 100 million people in Indonesia[6]. 87 million
people lost power for more than 48 hours in 2009 Brazil and Paraguay blackout[7]. Most
recently, 670 million people’s life and work were disturbed in July 2012 India blackout,
which is the largest single blackout in human history[8]. The reliability of the power grid
faces far more challenges than it has ever met before. Besides that, the mission for current
power grid is no longer just simply keeping lights on. The future power grid should be also
efficient, environmental friendly, secure and affordable.
1.1 Smart Grid
To address the major shortcomings of existing power grid, the next generation of power grid
known as ”smart grid” (SG) is introduced. The concept of SG first appears in the article
”Toward a smart grid: power delivery for the 21st century” by Amin and Wollenberg[9].
According to the Independent Electricity System Operator’s (IESO) definition, a smart
grid is a modern electric system that uses communications, sensors, automation and com-
puters to improve the flexibility, security, reliability, efficiency and safety of the electricity
system. According to the comparison shown in Table 1.1, the SG includes several major
characteristics shown below:
• Intelligent: SG can automatically sense system overload and reallocate the power
resource to prevent or minimize the potential outrage, with much less responding
time than that the manual operation requires.
• Efficient: In the current power grid, nearly 20% of the generation capacity is statically
used to meet the peak demand, which stands for only 5% of the total time. In
contrast, the power resource in SG can be dynamically allocated according to the
fast varying consumer demands.
• Accommodable: Besides the centralized traditional bulk generation (coal, natural
gas, hydro and nuclear), SG can integrate a large number of distributed and variable
renewable energy sources such as solar, wind and tide.
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Table 1.1: Comparison between the Smart Grid and the Existing Power Grid[1]
Existing Power Grid Smart Grid
Electromechanical Digital
One-way Communication Two-way Communication
Centralized Generation Distributed Generation
Hierarchical Network
Few Sensors Sensors Throughout
Blind Self-monitoring
Manual Restoration Self-healing
Failures and Blackouts Adaptive and Islanding
Manual Check/Test Remote Check/Test
Limited Control Pervasive Control
Few Customer Choices Many Customer Choices
• Resilient: SG should be protected by secure protocol to defend deliberate attack.
Decentralized network structure should also be adopted to make the system more
resistant to natural disaster such as hurricane and frozen rain.
• Environmental friendly: Renewable energy sources should stand for higher percentage
in the total generation capacity of SG in order to reduce the greenhouse gas (GHG)
emission.
Currently, there is no standard architecture for SG, due to the various communication
protocols and power grid standards. The most widely accepted architecture for SG is the
reference model (Figure 1.1) proposed by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST). Seven important domains are defined as below:
• Bulk Generation domain: The Bulk Generation domain contains energy sources in
bulk quantities. These energy sources can be either non-variable (coal and hydro) or
variable (solar and wind).
3
 Figure 1.1: NIST Framework of Smart Grid[3]
• Transmission domain: Transmission domain is the backbone to massively transfer
electricity over long distance. High voltage transmission lines, high voltage switches
and high voltage transformers are key components in Transmission domain.
• Distribution domain: The Distribution domain includes the medium voltage trans-
mission network (<50 kV) and distribution transformers (e.g. 12.47 kV to 120 V) to
distribute the electricity to the end customers.
• Customer domain: The Customer domain consists of home, commercial/building and
industrial users. The smart meter, which collects the customer’s information about
energy usage and patterns, is an essential device to control and manage the flow of
electricity.
• Operations domain: The Operations domain is responsible for the management and
control on the electricity flow in the SG, based on the information collected through
the two-way communication network in the SG.
• Markets domain: The Markets domain operates and coordinates the electricity mar-
kets in the SG to build a competitive market environment.
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• Service Provider domain: The Service Provider domain consists of third-party entities
that provide new and innovative supporting services to meet the demand of markets.
1.2 Vehicle to Grid Network
With the growing global climate warming problem, GHG emission reduction has drawn
significant attentions from government, industry and academia in recent years. Govern-
ment of Canada has committed to reduce Canada’s total GHG emission by 17% from
2005 to 2020[10]. Statistic data in Figure 1.2 shows that transportation accounts for 24%
in Canada’s total CO2 emission, which is the largest single source of CO2 emission[11].
Fuel switching is a strongly recommended solution to reduce the GHG emission from
transportation[12]. Electrification of automobile transportation, especially deploying elec-
tric or hybrid automobiles, is regarded as an effective method to massively reduce the GHG
emission.
 
Transportation 
24% 
Oil and Gas 
22% 
Electricity  
14% 
Buildings 
12% 
Emissions Intensive 
& Trade Exposed 
Industries 
11% 
Agriculture 
10% 
Waste & Others 
7% 
Figure 1.2: Source of GHG Emission in Canada 2010 by Economic Sector
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To this end, large number of electric vehicles (EVs) should be deployed. Vehicle-
to-grid (V2G) network is an infrastructure to support EVs, which uses the aggregated
EVs as a distributed load or source to exchange power with the power grid[13]. Besides
supporting EV and reducing GHG emission, V2G network can significantly enhance the
efficiency of power grid by providing more flexible regulation service. Specifically, two
kinds of regulation services can be provided from V2G network to the power grid. They
are supply-demand equilibrium and frequency regulation[13] [14].
• Supply-demand equilibrium is to compensate for the peak load of the power grid with
the power from the V2G network. There are two methods for the V2G network to get
the power for supply-demand equilibrium. One is to reduce the charging power for
the EVs under charging. The V2G network temperately reduces the power for the EV
charging, and re-allocates the reduced power for supply-demand equilibrium. During
this period, the charging power for the EVs will be temperately lower than their
expected levels. Once the supply-demand equilibrium completes, the EVs regain
their expected charging power. The other method is to make use of the energy
stored in the EVs’ batteries. Each EV can serve as a distributed source. Under
V2G network’s command, the EVs discharge their batteries to output the power for
supply-demand equilibrium.
• Frequency regulation is to maintain the frequency of the power grid at a stable
level by increasing or decreasing the generators’ output power. Instead of directly
adjusting the output power of the bulk generator, V2G network provides frequency
regulation service to the power grid by commanding the EVs to charge or discharge
at appropriate time. If the power grid has a demand on more power, more EVs in the
V2G network discharge to provide the required power. Otherwise, more EVs under
the V2G network’s command to charge and consume more power in the power grid.
Compared with traditional methods to provide regulation service with bulk generators,
V2G network can provide supply-demand equilibrium and frequency regulation with these
benefits below:
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1. High-utilization: The traditional method of supply-demand equilibrium to prevent
outrage occurring is to install additional bulk generators, which generate additional
electricity to meet the maximum peak demand. However, the maximum peak de-
mand may only occur 80 - 100 hours each year[15]. Much of the generating capacity
remains unused in most time of a year. In contrast, if the supply-demand equilibrium
service is provided by V2G network, such low utilization can be prevented. In V2G
network, the EVs can be regarded as a large number of distributed energy sources.
By accumulating many EV batteries’ discharging power, V2G network can provide
considerable power to meet the peak demand of the power gird in a much more
efficient way.
2. Fast-response: Typically, the duration of regulation service is several minutes, with
a requirement on response time in no more than one minute[16]. To meet such
requirement in a traditional way, the bulk generators need to operate at a minute
by minute status, which not only faces a lot of technical difficulties but also causes
addition mechanical wear and cost on bulk generators. On the other hand, V2G
network can easily fulfill such requirement with little additional cost. The battery
on the EV can respond in milliseconds, which is much faster than bulk generator
can ever achieve. By controlling large number of EVs to transit between charging
status and discharging status, V2G network can provide regulation service with a
much faster response time.
3. Less additional investment: To the provide regulation service in a traditional way,
additional facilities, such as spare bulk generators, transformers and transmission
lines, need to be installed. Additional investment should also be done for bulk gen-
erator purchasing, installation and maintenance. In contrast, very little additional
investment is required for V2G network to provide such regulation service, since the
power for regulation service can be directly obtained from the EVs with existing V2G
network infrastructure.
Due to the essentiality in both GHG emission reduction and efficiency enhancement in
the power grid, V2G network is an important component of the SG. V2G network’s major
contribution on power grid efficiency promotion is to provide flexible regulation service
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by utilizing the EV batteries. However, each individual EV battery with kilowatt-level
power is too tiny to have an effective contribution to the demand of regulation service in
power grid, which is normally megawatt-level at least. To this end, the aggregator (AGG) is
introduced in V2G network to accumulate the large number of distributed EV batteries into
a single load or source that can have a significant impact on the power grid[13] [17]. EVs
have direct physical connection with the aggregator to exchange electricity. Consequently,
V2G network includes these components as shown in Figure1.3.
• Aggregator: The Aggregator (AGG) accumulates the large number of distributed
Electric Vehicle (EV) batteries into a single load or source as shown in Figure1.4. It
is in the Distribution domain of the SG.
• Electric Vehicle: The Electric Vehicle (EV) is in the Customer domain of the SG to
exchange power with the AGG.
• Independent System Operator: The Independent System Operator (ISO) is respon-
sible for maintaining the stability of the power grid by monitoring and controlling
the power flow in V2G network. It locates in the Operations domain of the SG.
• Energy Service Provider: The Energy Service Provider (ESP) is to provide electricity
supply to charging AGGs. It also provides regulation service to the power grid with
the power obtained from the discharging AGGs. Because of the ESP’s essentiality in
power distribution, it plays an important role in the Distribution domain of the SG.
1.3 Research Motivation and Objective
Due to the fast up-going oil price and the increasing environmental concerns, the EV, which
has a steady up-going market penetration rate, can slowly but steadily take place of the
traditional internal combustion engine vehicle and play a more and more important role
in people’s daily life. Different from traditional internal combustion engine vehicle, which
is a pure mechanical device, the EV is the combination of vehicle technology, electricity
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 Figure 1.3: Structure of V2G Network
technology and information technology. While benefitting from the merits of information
technology, the EV has to suffer corresponding privacy-preservation problems in communi-
cation network. In addition, because of the combination with vehicle technology and elec-
tricity technology, the privacy-preservation issues for the EV faces more challenges than
that in traditional communication network. New privacy-preservation problems in terms
of attribute privacy and lifestyle privacy are introduced in V2G network. Unique features
are also addressed to the existing privacy-preservation problem such as location privacy,
due to the combined characteristics of vehicle system and electricity system. Specifically,
the challenges on privacy-preservation issues in V2G network can be classified into the
following three aspects:
• Attribute privacy: Each individual EV is quite different from each other in many
aspects. For instance, a bus consumes more power than a car does. It takes more
time for a bus to charge the battery. In addition, a bus is used for public service,
which is essential in a city’s daily operation. Thus, a bus should have higher priority
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 Figure 1.4: Aggregator in V2G Network
in charging services from the AGG. To the best of knowledge, different EVs may vary
in preferred operation point (POP), battery volume, default ESP, charging priority,
credit history, driving history, etc. These features can be regarded as the attributes
on the EVs. It is reasonable for the AGG to provide charging services with different
qualities to the EVs based on the evaluation on the EVs’ attributes. However, some
attributes such as POP, default ESP and credit history are quite sensitive. It is an
open problem to preserve EV’s attribute privacy when the EV is evaluated by AGG.
• Lifestyle privacy: While exchanging the electricity with the AGG, the EV’s bat-
tery condition should be continuously monitored by AGG. There are two reasons
for such continuous monitoring. First, improperly charging or discharging parameter
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setting can be harmful to the EV’s battery. The battery charging parameters need
to be adjusted due to the varying EV battery status during the charging process.
Thus, in order to prevent damages to the EV battery life, continuous monitoring on
the EV battery condition should be performed to provide information for dynamic
charging parameter adjustment[13]. Second, the total number of connecting EVs in
V2G network is highly dynamic. Any EV may join or leave the V2G network at
any time. In order to provide a relatively stable regulation service to the backbone
power grid, continuous monitoring on the EV battery condition is necessary for the
control on the EVs’ arriving and departure. However, private information such as
charging/discharging power, time, duration and state of charge is sensitive. By ana-
lyzing this monitoring information on a specified EV, such as when this EV started
to charge or how much power this EV charged, the EV owner’s lifestyle can be easily
deduced.
• Location privacy: Mobility is a distinguishing feature of vehicle. Different from
internal combustion engine vehicle, the EV only has very limited range, due to the
low energy density of batteries compared to fossil fuel. In addition, the EV requires
hours-long recharge time compared to the relatively seconds-fast process of refueling
a tank. As a result, the EV needs to connect to the AGG to have its battery charged
once it is possible, especially while parking at home or work place. Unfortunately,
the EV owner’s location privacy can be easily violated in such a scenario. The AGG
and its belonging ESP can easily track the EV owner’s location from such frequent
connections.
In conclusion, the privacy-preservation concern becomes a significant issue in V2G
network[18][19]. Without appropriate privacy-preserving mechanics, customers may be
reluctant to join in the V2G network. As a result, the replacement of internal combusting
engine vehicle, the modernization of the power grid and the reduction in GHG emission
all may be hindered. Thus, it is paramountly necessary to solve the privacy-preservation
problem in V2G network.
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1.4 Problem Formation
In V2G network, the local total electricity power of each AGG is limited. If too many
EVs request charging service from one particular AGG at the same time, the total re-
quired power may be more than the maximum supply power that the AGG can provide.
In such scenario, all the EVs have to share the maximum supply power from the AGG.
The simplest charging power allocation scheme is to equally allocate the charging power to
each EV. However, such simple scheme makes all the EVs’ charging power below their pre-
ferred operation points (POPs), which means none of the EVs can have quality guaranteed
charging service. Each EV can not receive its expected charging power from the AGG.
It contradicts some important EVs’ requirements on charging service quality and ignores
the market’s demands on diverse charging service qualities[20][21]. For instance, some EVs
such as police vehicles, ambulances and taxis are used for public service. Their charging
power should be guaranteed to reduce their charging time as much as possible due to their
essentiality in a city’s public service. Some private EVs may be also willing to pay more
money to the electricity service provider (ESP) for priority charging service. Considering
this, a novel charging scheme with multi-quality services i.e., “quality guaranteed service”
(QGS) and “best of effort service” (BES), as shown in Figure 1.5 is introduced. In QGS,
the charging power for the EV can be guaranteed at its POP. In BES, the EV’s charging
power varies depending on the remaining power after QGS in the AGG.
To determine each EV’s service quality, the AGG should evaluate individual EV’s
attributes, such as public/private use, priority service contract, POP level, credit history
level, driving history level, default ESP etc. The evaluation is based on a policy made by
AGG, according to its local electricity resource condition. The different AGGs’ policies
may also be different due to their different local resource conditions and different default
ESPs. For example, “private vehicle” AND “priority service contract” OR “public vehicle”
OR “Ambulance” can have QGS in a resource abundant AGG. In a resource limited AGG,
the policy may be ‘public vehicle” AND “Ambulance”, which means neither any private
vehicles nor any public vehicles except the ambulances can have QGS.
However, the privacy concern is an obvious barrier to the proposed multi-quality charg-
ing scheme in V2G network.
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 Figure 1.5: QGS and BES in V2G Network
• The AGG’s evaluation on the EV is necessary to determine its service quality. The
EV’s attributes, such as service contract, credit history, driving violation history,
default ESP etc, is sensitive information. If this kind of information is directly
revealed to the AGG, the EV owner’s privacy could be violated. For instance, the
EV owner’s occupation can be obtained by analyzing the charging plan in the service
contract. The EV owner’s financial situation can also be inferred from inspecting the
credit history.
• Performing continuous monitoring on the EV battery’s state of charge is essential
during the charging service. However, such continuous monitoring reveals the detail
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of the EV battery status to the AGG. By analyzing this information, the EV owner’s
lifestyle and occupation may be deduced. For example, unusual charging with a small
amount of electricity indicates the EV may be not frequently used. The owner of
the EV may be a retired man who usually stays at home. Frequent charging with a
lot electricity implies the owner of the EV may be a salesman who always goes on
business. Target marketing can be performed based on this information. Unexpected
advertising such as fliers, emails and phone calls may arrive to the EV owners.
• The location of each charging port is known to the AGG. Once the EV parks in
a lot and plugs into the charging port, the AGG can obtain that EV’s very exact
position. If the AGG can also get the EV’s real identity, the EV owner’s location
can be exposed to the AGG.
Motivated by the privacy concerns above, the goal of this thesis is to design a privacy-
preserving multi-quality charging (PMQC) scheme in V2G network. While providing multi-
quality charging services to the EVs , the proposed scheme should solve the privacy-
preservation problems listed above. To this end, by exploiting the unique features of V2G
network, a novel evaluation and authentication protocol based on proper encryption and
signature algorithms is proposed to achieve the privacy-preservation in the multi-quality
charging scheme. Specifically, the contributions can be summarized in three-fold:
1. An evaluation mechanism on the EV’s attributes is proposed to determine the EV’s
charging service quality. While achieving fine-grained access control on the qualified
EV for QGS, the EV’s attributes are kept secret to the AGG during the evaluation.
2. The EV’s real identity is kept confidential to the AGG when the AGG performs the
authentication and bill generation on the EV. Based on this, the EV owner’s lifestyle
privacy and location privacy are also preserved.
3. Performance evaluation shows the computation overhead of authentication in the
proposed scheme can achieve higher efficiency, compared with other authentication
schemes in V2G network.
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1.5 Literature Review on Related Work
Currently, the research on privacy-preservation in the V2G network is still at the early
stage. The researches focus on various issues including security architecture, authentication
mechanism and key management in V2G network.
Yang et.al [22] propose a privacy-preserving rewarded architecture, which focuses on
the anonymous authentication. The main idea is to hide the EV’s real identity by adopting
the ID-based restrictive partially blind signature [23], when the EV is authenticated by the
AGG. The EV can get the charging service from the AGG if and only if the EV provides
a valid permit, which is secretly issued by the control center. Even though the AGG can
obtain all the detail information about the EV during the charging service, it can hardly
link this detail monitoring information with any specified EV owner’s real identity. In this
way, the EV owner’s location privacy and lifestyle privacy are both preserved. Besides the
anonymous authentication, a rewarded architecture is also introduced to encourage the
EVs to participate in the V2G network.
Tseng further develops Yang’s work. In [24], the certificate-less public key cryptography
is introduced to simplify the certificate management and overcome the key escrow problem
in Yang’s scheme.
Liu et.al propose an authentication scheme in V2G network. In [25], Liu et.al claim
that the EV should be associated with a default interest group. Besides charging from
the default group, the EV may also visit other groups and have charging service from
them due to the EV’s mobility. In such scenario, two charging service modes are defined
for the EV, home mode and visiting mode. Specifically, home mode is for the EV having
charging service from the default AGG. Visiting mode is for the EV having charging service
from the other interest group’s AGG. An aggregated authentication scheme is proposed
to authenticate the EV in either home mode or visiting mode, without revealing its real
identity to the AGG. The anonymous authentication is based on the aggregated proof,
which is developed from the coexistence-proof in radio frequency identification (RFID).
In addition, the authentication can also be performed for multiple EVs at the same time.
Thus, the computational overhead for authentication is significantly reduced. Meanwhile,
the battery status monitoring data can also be periodically collected by AGG without
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compromising individual EV’s privacy.
In [26], Tseng proposes a robust aggregated message authentication protocol for privacy-
preservation in the V2G network. The computation overhead is significantly reduced by
utilizing authentication aggregation and batch verification techniques.
In [27], Liu et.al investigate a new security problem based on the EV’s varying battery
status. While interacting with the AGG, the EV’s battery may be in one of the following
states: charging, fully-charged (FC) and discharging. The EV’s private information such
as location, occupation and lifestyle may be obtained by AGG, through analyzing the
battery status information under different battery states. To this end, a battery status-
aware authentication scheme is proposed to prevent the EV owner’s privacy from being
violated. Specifically, three security measures are performed during the three different
battery status transitions. First, during the charging-to-FC state transition, an aggregated-
identifier is proposed to ensure that each EV can be authenticated without revealing its real
identity. Second, during the transition of FC-to-discharging, anonymous data transmission
is achieved by selective disclosure based challenge-response authentication. Third, during
the discharging-to-charging transition, an aggregated status reporting is performed in order
keep each EV batteries’ power level confidential to the AGG.
Besides the privacy-preservation issues, there are some works on other security issues in
V2G network. Guo et.al [28] propose a batch authentication protocol for fast authentica-
tion in V2G network. The motivation comes from the fact that the EV can only have very
limited connection time for data transmission during driving. In this scheme, the AGG
aggregates the received signatures from multiple EVs into a batch at intervals. Then the
AGG verifies the batch of EVs’ signatures, instead of verifying each EV’s signature. Vaidya
et.al [29] propose a multi-domain network architecture for the V2G network. They claim
that the utilities in the V2G network may be belonged to different independent realms.
The authentication and verification should be performed across different realms. In such
scenario, challenges arise in the key management among different realms. To this end, a
multi-domain network architecture with a hybrid PKI model is introduced to solve such
security challenge.
There are more works focusing on the security issues in the SG. Liang et.al [30] propose a
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usage-based dynamic pricing scheme for the SG in a community environment, which enables
the electricity price to correspond to the electricity usage in real time. While supporting
real-time dynamic pricing in an efficient and privacy-preserving manner, the privacy of the
customer is protected by restricting the disclosure of the individual electricity usage to
the community gateways. Wen et.al [31] propose a novel privacy-preserving range query
scheme over encrypted metering data to address the privacy issues in financial auditing for
SG. The proposed scheme allows a residential user to store metering data on a cloud sever
in an encrypted form. When financial auditing is needed, an authorized requester can send
its range query tokens to the cloud sever to retrieve the metering data. While the data
confidentiality and query privacy are preserved, only the authorized requesters can obtain
the query results. Li et.al [32] propose an efficient authentication scheme that employs the
Merkle hash tree technique to secure SG communication. Detail security analysis indicates
that the proposed scheme can be resilient to the replay attack and the message modification
attack.
However, all the works above simply assume all the EVs are identical and ignore the
difference in attributes among the EVs. In addition, none of them consider the market’s de-
mand on diverse EV charging service qualities and the corresponding privacy-preservation
problem. In this thesis, a privacy-preserving multi-quality charging (PMQC) scheme in
V2G network is proposed to evaluate and authenticate the EV without violating its pri-
vate information. Specifically, an evaluation mechanism is introduced to determine the
EV’s charging service quality according to the EV’s attributes. Based on the ciphertext-
policy attribute based encryption (CP-ABE), the PMQC prevents the EV’s attributes from
being disclosed to the AGG during the evaluation. Furthermore, an authentication proto-
col based on group signature is constructed in the PMQC to verify the EV’s eligibility for
charging service without obtaining its real identity.
1.6 Thesis Outline
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 introduces the related encryption and signature algorithms. The system model
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is defined in Chapter 3, including network model, trust model and security requirements.
Chapter 4 formulates the proposed privacy-preserving multi-quality charging (PMQC)
scheme in V2G network. Chapter 5 presents the security analysis and performance evalu-
ation on the PMQC. Based on the PMQC in Chapter 4, the extended privacy-preserving
multi-quality charging (ePMQC) scheme in V2G network and corresponding performance
enhancement are introduced in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 closes the thesis with conclusions
and the future work.
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Chapter 2
Cryptography Fundamental
This chapter introduces the related cryptography fundamental. The properties of bilinear
map is briefly described in Section 2.1. Then the attribute based encryption and the group
signature are separately introduced in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3.
2.1 Bilinear Map
Bilinear map is an important algebra structure in cryptography. The exact mathematic
definition of bilinear map is very complex and abstract. Because this thesis focuses on
the privacy-preservation issues in V2G network, only the properties of bilinear map are
introduced in this section to help the readers have a better understanding of following part
of the thesis.
G and GT are assumed to be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. The
map e : G × G → GT is said to be a bilinear map, if the group operation in G and the
map e : G×G→ GT are both efficiently computable.
The bilinear map e has the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: For any u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z∗p, we have e(ua , v b) = e(u, v)ab . Specifi-
cally, e(u1 · u2, v) = e(u1, v) · e(u2, v).
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2. Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1, where g is a generator of G.
3. Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v) for ∀u, v ∈ G
Here Z∗p denotes the multiplicative integer group under multiplication modulo p, sat-
isfying Z∗p = {z ∈ Zp | gcd(z, p) = 1}, where Zp is the set of integers {0, 1, 2, · · · , p − 1}.
gcd(z, p) is the function to get the greatest common divisor of integer z and p.
2.2 Attribute-Based Encryption
Asymmetric cryptography is a fundamental security ingredient in cryptosystems, applica-
tions and protocols. The concept of asymmetric cryptography was first introduced by W.
Diffie and M. Hellman[33] in 1976. Different from that in the symmetric cryptography, the
sender Bob and the receiver Alice in the asymmetric cryptography do not need to securely
share a key in advance. Instead, the receiver Alice generates a pair of private and public
keys. The public key, which is published to the public by Alice, is used by the sender Bob
to encrypt the plaintext. The private key, which is kept confidential by Alice, is used by
Alice to decrypt the ciphertext from Bob. Typical asymmetric encryption algorithms such
as RSA and ElGamal are designed to securely share the secret information with a known
specific user. What these algorithms have in common is to require the sender to determine
the target receiver before encryption. Then the sender encrypts the secret information
with the target receiver’s public key. For example, the sender Bob first needs to determine
it is Alice who is the target receiver. Then he encrypts the message with Alice’s public key
and sends the ciphertext to her. However, those algorithms with such requirement may
not be suitable for the scenario like cloud computing, where the sender wishes to share the
data to the receivers according to some policies on the receiver’s credentials.
To solve that problem, Sahai and Waters [34] introduce the concept of attribute-based
encryption (ABE). In ABE, the plaintext is not encrypted with one specific receiver’s public
key. Instead, the plaintext is encrypted with a predicate f() defined by the sender. In this
predicate f(), the sender can express how he wants to securely share this plaintext. The
receiver has the private keys associated with his credentials S. If and only if f(S) = 1 can
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the receiver decrypt the ciphertext under the predicate f(). In Sahai and Waters work, the
receiver’s credentials called “attributes” is a set of string, and the predicate called “policy”
is described by a formula over these attributes.
Based on the initial work of Sahai and Waters, the concept of attribute-based encryption
is further developed. Two forms of ABE are addressed, Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) and
Ciphertext-Policy ABE.
2.2.1 Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
In Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE), the ciphertext is encrypted with a set of attributes. The
receiver’s private key is associated with a policy based on these attributes. The receiver is
able to decrypt the ciphertext, if the ciphertext’s attributes match the policy in the receiv-
er’s private key. For example, the Document A is KP-ABE encrypted with the following
attributes: “Electrical and Computer Engineering”, “Graduate Student”, “Network Secu-
rity”. The Document B is KP-ABE encrypted with the following attributes: “Electrical
and Computer Engineering”, “Faculty”, “Network Security”. The Faculty A specializing
in image processing is from Electrical and Computer Engineering. His private key is as-
sociated with the policy {“Electrical and Computer Engineering” AND “Faculty” AND
“Image Processing”} OR “Graduate Student”. The Document A’s attributes match the
Faculty A’s policy. Thus, the Faculty A can decrypt the ciphertext and get the Document
A. In contrast, the Document B’s attributes mismatch the Faculty A’s policy. Faculty A
cannot decrypt the corresponding ciphertext to view the Document B.
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 Figure 2.1: Key-Policy Attribute Based Encryption System
Goyal et.al [35] first introduce the concept of KP-ABE. In his work, a general KP-ABE
scheme with better applicability than that in [34] is proposed. In Goyal’s construction, the
ciphertext is encrypted with a set of attributes and the receiver’s private key is associated
with a policy which can be described with a tree structure. The tree structure is a fine-
grained access control structure supporting “AND”, “OR” and “Threshold” operations.
The scheme is proved to be Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA) secure under the decisional-
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (d-BDH) assumption in the standard model. There are four phases
in Goyal’s proposed KP-ABE scheme as shown in Figure 2.1:
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• Setup: The input is a security parameter ψ. The outputs are the public parameter
PK and the master key MK. The Setup phase is performed by Key Generation
Center (KGC), which is a fully trusted entity.
• Key Generation (PK,MK,A): The inputs of the Key Generation phase are the
public parameter PK, the master key MK and the policy which is expressed in the
access structure A. The output is the private key SK associated with access structure
A. This phase is performed by the KGC. The private key SK should be delivered to
the corresponding receiver through secure channel.
• Encryption (PK,M, S): The inputs are the public parameter PK, the plaintext
M and the attribute set S. The output is the ciphertext CT associated with the
attribute set S.
• Decryption (PK, SK,CT, S): The inputs are the public parameter PK, the re-
ceiver’s private key SK and the ciphertext CT with the attribute set S. The receiver
performs this phase to decrypt CT . If the ciphertext’s attribute set S matches the
policy that associated with the receiver’s private key, the Decryption phase can be
performed successfully to output the plaintext M .
Ostrovsky et.al [36] further develop Goyal’s work. While maintaining the CCA security
under the d-BDH assumption in the standard model, Ostrovsky’s scheme adds “NEG”
operation to describe the access control structure. With “AND”, “OR”, “Threshold” and
the newly added “NEG” operation, the access control structure becomes more flexible.
2.2.2 Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
Different from that in the KP-ABE, the ciphertext in the Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-
ABE) is encrypted with a policy by the sender, and the receiver’s private key is associated
with the attributes. The receiver can decrypt the CP-ABE ciphertext if and only if a
matching between the ciphertext’s policy and the private key’s attributes exists. The
structure of a CP-ABE system is shown in Figure 2.2.
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 Figure 2.2: Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Encryption System
Bethencourt et.al [37] first explicitly propose a CP-ABE scheme. Similar to the scheme
in [35], the policy is described with a tree structure, which is also a fine grained access
control structure supporting “AND”, “OR” and “Threshold” operations. Besides that,
Bethencourt’s scheme supports private key delegation. Thus there are five phases in the
scheme:
• Setup: This phase takes a security parameter ψ as input and outputs the public
parameter PK and the master key MK.
• Key Generation (MK,S): The Key Generation phase in the CP-ABE takes the
master key MK and the receiver’s attribute set S as input. The output is the private
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key SK with the receiver’s attribute set S. The output is the receiver’s private key
SK, which should be delivered to the receiver through secure channel.
• Encryption (PK,M,A): The inputs are the public parameter PK, the plaintext
M and the access structure A defined by the sender. The outputs are the access
structure A and the ciphertext CT , which is encrypted under the access structure A.
• Decryption (PK, SK,CT,A): The inputs are the public parameter PK, the re-
ceiver’s private key SK and the ciphertext CT with corresponding access structure
A. If the attribute set S of the receiver’s private key matches the access structure A
associated with ciphertext CT , the ciphertext CT can be decrypted.
• Delegation (SK, S ′): This phase updates the attributes of the private key. It takes
the new attribute set S ′ and the old private key SK with attribute set S as input.
The output is the new private key SK ′ with the new attribute set S ′.
Bethencourt’s scheme achieves analogous expressiveness and fine-grained access control.
The scheme is proved to be CCA secure under the Generic Bilinear Group [38] in the
random oracle model. But the security proof is less than ideal, because the Generic Bilinear
Group assumption is too strong, which assumes the attacker needs to access an oracle in
order to perform any group operation [2].
To achieve a better security, Cheung et.al [39] propose a scheme which is proved to be
CCA secure under the d-BDH assumption in the standard model. However, this scheme
only supports “AND” and “NEG” operations in the access structure.
To overcome the shortcoming of Cheung’s scheme, Goyal et.al [40] propose a new CP-
ABE scheme with a bounded size access tree. Two parameters are set to limit the height
and the number of children in the access tree. In addition, an “universal access tree” is
also introduced to construct a mapping in order to transform a KP-ABE system into a
CP-ABE system. The scheme is proved to be CCA secure under the d-BDH assumption
in the standard model.
Waters et.al [2] further develop the CP-ABE. The efficiency in Water’s scheme is sig-
nificantly improved by expressing the access control structure with a Linear Secret Sharing
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Table 2.1: Comparison of the CP-ABE Schemes[2]
Scheme Ciphertext Size Private Key Size Enc. Time Assumption
Bethencourt’s O(n) O(A) O(n) Generic Group
Goyal’s O(U · n3.42max) O(n3.42max · A) O(n3.42max · U) d-BDH
Waters’s First O(n) O(A) O(n) d-Parallel BDHE
Waters’s Second O(n) O(kmax · A) O(n) d-BDHE
Waters’s Third O(n2) O(kmax · A+ nmax) O(n2) d-BDH
Scheme (LSSS) matrix. Three constructions are provided under three different security
assumptions. The first construction is the simplest one with the highest efficiency. It
is proved to be CCA secure under the decisional-Parallel Bilinear-Diffie Hellman Expo-
nent (d-Parallel BDHE) assumption, which is a relatively strong secure assumption in
the standard model. The second construction is CCA secure under the slightly weaker
decisional-Bilinear-Diffie Hellman Exponent (d-BDHE) assumption in the standard model
with a little efficiency drop. The third construction provides the strongest security. It is
proved to be CCA secure under the weak d-BDH assumption in the standard model. Even
though its strong security is achieved at the expense of efficiency deterioration, it still has
a better efficiency than that in Goyal’s scheme [40]. The comparison of efficiency among
the CP-ABE schemes is shown in Table 2.1. Here n is the size of an access formula, A is
the number of attributes in a user’s private key, T is the number of nodes satisfied of a
formula by a user’s attributes, and U is the number of attributes defined in the system.
2.2.3 Comparison of the Encryption Algorithms
The Table 2.2 is a comparison of some typical asymmetric encryption methods. Here
”Para” indicates the public parameter in the specified system. “ID” indicates the identity
of the Decipherer in IBE. “S” indicates the attributes in ABE. ”A” is the access control
structure based on the attributes S. From the comparison we can clearly see that both
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KP-ABE and CP-ABE are much more flexible in secure mechanism design. Thus, the first
CP-ABE construction of Waters’s work [2] is adopted in the thesis.
2.3 Group Signature
The digital signature is another important application of asymmetric cryptography. The
concept of digital signature is first described by W. Diffie and M. Hellman [33]. The digital
signature on a message is generated by the signature signer with his private key. Then the
message with corresponding digital signature is transmitted to the receiver. By verifying
the digital signature with the signature signer’s public key, the receiver can perform au-
thentication on the signature signer, check the integrity and ensure the non-repudiation of
the message.
In the typical digital signatures such as RSA and DSA, the signature signer’s identity
needs to be revealed to the public. This feature makes the typical digital signatures hardly
satisfy the requirement of anonymity in some scenarios such as electronic voting and bid
inviting, where the identity of the signer should be kept secret. To this end, the concept
of group signature is introduced by Chaum et.al [41] in 1991. In group signature, the
singer should be a member of a certain group. As a member of a group, the signer can
anonymously sign a message on behalf of its belonging group. While verifying the group
signature to check the message’s integrity and ensure its non-repudiation, the receiver can
only perform the authentication on the group instead of the individual who signs the group
signature. In this way, the signer’s identity is kept confidential to the receiver. In addition,
there should be a group manager in each group, who is responsible for group member
managing and tracking the identity of the signer in the event of disputes. Generally, there
are following characteristics of the group signature [42][43]:
• Anonymity: Given a valid group signature, it is computationally impossible for any
entity except the group manager to reveal the identity of actual signer.
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Table 2.2: Comparison of the Asymmetric Encryption Algorithms
Traditional
Asymmetric
Encryption
Identity Based En-
cryption
KP-ABE CP-ABE
Master
Key
MK
None Randomly selected by
KGC
Randomly selected
by KGC
Randomly selected
by KGC
Private
Key
SK
Randomly select-
ed by Decipherer
SK = (Par, ID,MK)
generated by KGC
SK = (Par,A,MK)
generated by KGC
SK = (Par, S,MK)
generated by KGC
Public
Key
PK
PK = (Par, SK)
generated by De-
cipherer
PK = (Par, ID) gen-
erated by Encipherer
PK = (Par, S) gen-
erated by Encipherer
PK = (Par,A) gen-
erated by Encipherer
Public
Key
Certifi-
cate
Required Not required Not required Not required
Relation
between
PK
and SK
1. One SK can
only map to one
PK
1. One SK can only
map to one PK
1. Multiple SKs can
map to multiple PKs
1. Multiple SKs
can map to multiple
PKs
2. Only one PK
can be chosen by
Encipherer
2. Multiple PKs can
be chosen by Enci-
pherer
2. Multiple PKs can
be chosen by Enci-
pherer
2. Multiple PKs can
be chosen by Enci-
pherer.
3. No restriction
on Decipher-
er’s decryption
capability
3. The Decipherer’s
decryption capability
is restricted by KGC
3. The Decipherer’s
decryption capability
is restricted by KGC
and Encipherer
3. The Decipher-
er’s decryption capa-
bility is restricted by
KGC and Encipher-
er
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• Traceability: The group manager has the full capacity to open a valid group sig-
nature from his group and trace the identity of the individual who actually signs the
group signature.
• Unforgeability: Only the valid group member can generate the group signature on
behalf of its belonging group.
• Exculpability: Neither a group member nor the group manager can sign a group
signature on behalf of other members.
• Unlinkability: It is computationally impossible to judge whether or not two valid
group signatures are generated by the same individual.
• Conspiracy Attack Resistance: It is impossible for a subset of group members
to conspire to generate a special group signature, which is valid but impossible for
the group manager to open.
Chen et.al [44] provide solutions to the some open issues mentioned in the Chaum’s
work. First of all, dynamic group member participation is allowed in the proposed scheme.
In addition, some new concepts, such as “total convertible group signature”, “selective
convertible group signature” and “threshold group signature”, are introduced to the group
signature.
However, the length of the public key and the length of the group signature are linear
with the number of group members in both Chaum’s and Chen’s schemes. It seriously con-
strains the application of group signature in large systems, since the efficiency dramatically
deteriorates with the increase of the group size. To overcome such challenge, Camenisch
et.al [45] propose an efficient group signature scheme by introducing the concept of signa-
ture of knowledge. First of all, the length of the group public key and the length of the
group private key are independent of the number of group members, which means that they
are fixed in length. In addition, the scheme allows the group manager to add new group
members without updating the group public key. Benefiting from these two features, the
efficiency is significantly improved in Camenisch’s scheme. While further improving the
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efficiency, Ateniese et.al [42] propose a conspiracy attack resistant group signature scheme
based on Camenisch’s work.
All the group signature schemes above do not consider the group member revocation
problem, which is necessary in the the group management. Bresson et.al [46] first propose
a scheme including group member revocation. But the computation overhead of group
signature verification in Bresson’s scheme is linear with the number of revoked members.
Based on Bresson’s work, Camenisch et.al [47] improve the revocation efficiency by adopt-
ing a dynamic accumulator. Boneh et.al [48] introduce a new revocation mechanism named
Verifier-Local Revocation (VLR). In Boneh’s scheme, only the signature verifiers are noti-
fied about the revocation list, which includes a fragment of the revoked users’ private key.
As a result, the revocation process is simplified. Based on the previous work, Boneh et.al
[49] further develop the VLR revocation mechanism. Besides the considerable efficiency
promotion in revocation, the size of the group signature is also significantly reduced to
approximately the same size of a standard RSA signature.
In recent years, more schemes on group signature in the standard model are proposed
[50][51][52]. However, the strong security of these schemes comes at the expense of high
complexity and low efficiency. Considering this, Boneh’s scheme [49] is adopted in the
thesis.
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Chapter 3
System Model and Security
Requirements
In this chapter, the system model of the proposed privacy-preserving multi-quality charging
(PMQC) scheme is introduced in Section 3.1. Then the security requirements on PMQC
are defined in Section 3.2.
3.1 System Model
The electricity flow in V2G network can be unidirectional or bidirectional. In the bidirec-
tional V2G network, the AGG can provide the power grid with regulation service, by letting
connected EVs charge to consume power from the power grid or discharge to feed power
back to the power grid. However, the implementation of bidirectional electricity flow in
V2G network has to face the various challenges in terms of technique, capital and market.
For example, the anti-islanding protection and other interconnection issues are addressed
in the bidirectional power grid[53]. To support the bidirectional electricity flow, consid-
erable investments in the electricity infrastructure updating on the current unidirectional
power grid are required. It is also speculated that consumers may be resistant to allowing
the utility company to pull energy from their batteries[54]. As a result, the unidirectional
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V2G network is more practical in implementation based on current well-developed unidi-
rectional electricity infrastructures[53]. In the unidirectional V2G network, the EVs can
only charge power from the AGG. By varying the EVs’ charging power around the EVs’
preferred operation points (POP), the unidirectional V2G network can also provide regula-
tion service to the power grid[55]. Thus, the electricity flow in V2G network is assumed to
be unidirectional in the system model. The “unidirectional V2G network” in the following
part of the thesis is referred as the “V2G network”.
To have charging service from the AGG, the EV should be authenticated by the AGG,
which checks the EV’s eligibility for the charging service. In addition, the AAG or the
EV should have a default Electricity Service Provider (ESP). If the EV and its visiting
AGG are in the same ESP, the AGG’s authentication on the EV can be easily performed.
However, problems arise in the authentication, if there are multiple different ESPs in a
region as shown in Figure 3.1. Due to the EV’s mobility, it is reasonable that the EV may
move to the area covered by a non-default ESP and visit the AGG of that non-default ESP.
For example, there are three ESPs in the Cambridge- Kitchener- Waterloo area, Waterloo
North Hydro Inc., Kitchener Wilmot Inc., and Cambridge and North Dumfries Hydro Inc..
Alice may live in Waterloo with the default ESP Waterloo North Hydro Inc.. Her office
may be in Cambridge, where the electricity is provided by Cambridge and North Dumfries
Hydro Inc.. During the work time, Alice often goes to Kitchener to do business. In such
scenario, it is a problem to perform the authentication on Alice’s EV across different ESPs.
The major obstacle is the fact that the different ESPs are market competitors, which makes
the different ESPs be unwilling to share their customers’ information with each other. To
this end, the Electric Vehicle Administration (EVA), which is an independent non-profit
institution, is introduced in the system model in this thesis to manage all the EVs in the
V2G network, and build a unified authentication mechanism on the EVs among different
ESPs. Specifically, the EVA issues a secret private key to each eligible EV when it registers
itself to the EVA. With the private key, the EV can answer the AGG’s challenge and pass
the authentication, no matter the EV and the AGG are in the same ESP or not. Thus,
authentication on the EVs across different ESPs can be achieved. Besides the private
key issuing, the EVA is also responsible for the EVs’ attributes allocation, private key
revocation and electricity fees charging.
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 Figure 3.1: ESP Distribution in Southern Ontario
As a result, there are four entities in the system model as shown in Figure 3.2. They
are Electric Vehicle Administration (EVA), Aggregator (AGG), Electric Vehicle (EV) and
Electricity Service Provider (ESP).
• The EVA is responsible for the administration on the EVs, including EVs’ real i-
dentity registering, attribute allocation and private key generation. The EVA is also
the central authority (CA) in Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to publish AGGs’
X.509 certification for secure channel establishment. Moreover, the EVA charges the
electricity fees for the charging service on the EV according to the bill generated by
AGG.
• The AGG provides multi-quality charging services to the EVs. There is unidirec-
tional electricity flow from the AGG to the EVs. The AGG performs evaluation
and authentication on the EV to determine its charging service quality and check its
eligibility for charging service. The evaluation is based on a certain policy defined
by AGG. Different AGGs in different default ESPs may have different policies. If
the EV passes both evaluation and authentication, the EV can have QGS. If the EV
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 Figure 3.2: System Model in PMQC
only passes authentication, it can only have BES. Once the EV finishes charging, the
AGG generates the EV’s bill. With the EV’s confirmation, the bill is transmitted to
the EVA for fees charging on the corresponding EV’s account.
• The EV can only charge power from the AGG. To have the charging service, the EV
must be evaluated and authenticated by the AGG with its private key issued from
EVA and stored in its non-reproducible storage.
• The ESP is the company to provide electricity. Each AGG has a belonging ESP.
Each ESP may have multiple AGGs. The ESP provides the electricity resource to
its AGGs. Specifically, there may be multiple ESPs in the V2G network.
The communication architecture is shown in Figure 3.2. The EVs can directly com-
municate with the EVA to synchronize the revocation list (RL). Cellular communication
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techniques such as LTE and WiMax are deployed between the EVs and the EVA, due to
the EVs’ huge number and large scale mobility. To have charging service, the EV should
park in the parking lot and have physical connection with the AGG. Thus various low cost
communication techniques, such as WiFi, ZigBee and PLC can be implemented for com-
munication between the EV and the AGG. Because of the remote and diverse distribution
of the AGGs, also considering the heavy load on data transmission, fiber optic is a better
choice for the communication between the AGG and the EVA.
3.2 Security Requirements
In the system model, the ESP is an electricity provider which does not participate in the
interactions with the EVs. It is not involved in the EV’s privacy-preservation issues. Thus,
the ESP is not considered in the trust model. There are three entities in the trust model,
EVA, AGG and EV.
• The EVA is a fully trusted entity. It has the full knowledge of all the EVs. This is
reasonable since the EVA is normally established by a government authority.
• The AGG is honest but curious to the EV, which means it basically follows the pro-
tocol in the proposed scheme but tires its best to obtain as much private information
of each EV as possible during interacting with the EV. Specifically, the private infor-
mation for the EV includes its real identity, attribute, position and the EV owner’s
lifestyle.
• The EV is the entity whose privacy needs to be preserved. It is honest to all other
entities. It can not maliciously modify, substitute or replay the messages to the AGG.
Based on the system model and trust model defined above, the goal in this thesis is to
develop a privacy-preserving multi-quality charging scheme in V2G network. Specifically,
the following four security requirements should be satisfied.
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1. Privacy Preservation: The EV’s attributes should not be obtained by AGG during
the evaluation. Individual EV’s real identity should not be disclosed to the AGG
during the authentication. The EV owner’s position and lifestyle privacy should not
be deduced during the charging service.
2. Fine-grained Access Control: The AGG defines the access policy of the evaluation
to determine which EV can have QGS. The access policy should be fine-grained. For
example, “private vehicle” AND “priority service contract” OR “public vehicle” can
have QGS. If and only if the EV’s attributes satisfy the access policy can the EV
have QGS.
3. Traceability: The EVA can trace the real identity of the EV according to the
bill generated by AGG and confirmed by EV. After tracing the EV’s real identity,
corresponding electricity fees for the charging service can be charged on the EV’s
account. The EV can not deny the fees for the charging service either.
4. Secure Revocation: The EV’s private key can be revoked by EVA. While revoking a
EV’s eligibility for charging, other EVs’ eligibility and privacy should not be violated.
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Chapter 4
Privacy-Preserving Multi-Quality
Charging Scheme in V2G Network
In this chapter, the overview of the proposed privacy-preserving multi-quality charging
(PMQC) scheme is introduced in Section 4.1. Then each phase of PMQC is explained in
detail in Section 4.2.
4.1 Overview of the Proposed Scheme
The design goal of PMQC is to preserve the EV’s attribute privacy, the EV owner’s lifestyle
and location privacy during the EV’s interactions with the AGG. The ciphertext-policy
attribute based encryption (CP-ABE) and group signature are utilized to achieve that
goal. The interactions between the EV and the AGG are shown in Figure 4.1.
At the beginning, EVk must be registered at the EVA with its real identity. The EVA
allocates the attribute set Sk to EVk, generates EVk’s private key SKk and creates an
account for EVk to map its real identity with the corresponding private keys. Then EVk
obtains its private keys SKk from the EVA secretly and stores it in its non-repudiable
storage.
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 Figure 4.1: Interactions in PMQC
When EVk connects to the AGG and requests for charging service, it first negotiates
a pseudonym PSk with the AGG to identify the session. Then the AGG performs service
level evaluation and service eligibility authentication on EVk to determine its charging
service level and charging service eligibility.
To evaluate EVk, the AGG randomly chooses two messages M1 and M2 for challenge.
One is a plaintext, another one is a CP-ABE encrypted ciphertext based on the AGG’s
accessing policy A. Then the challenge chlg is sent to EVk. After receiving the challenge
chlg from the AGG, EVk decrypts the CP-ABE ciphertext on M2. If the attribute set Sk
in EVk’s private key SKk matches the access poly A in the CP-ABE ciphertext, EVk can
successfully decrypt the CP-ABE ciphertext and obtain M2, which means EVk can have
QGS from the AGG. Otherwise, EVk can only have BES from the AGG.
In order to authenticate itself to the AGG, EVk generates the group signature on M1
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and M2 with its group signature private key GSK k , which is a part of its private key SKk.
Then EVk sends the group signature σ to the AGG. Otherwise, EVk can only generate the
group signature on M1. After receiving the group signature σ from EVk, the AGG verifies
the group signature. If the received signature is based on both M1 and M2, EVk can have
QGS from the AGG. If the received signature is based on M1, EVk can only have BES
from the AGG. If the group signature is invalid, EVk’s charging service request should be
rejected.
The EV obtains the charging service from the AGG by providing tokens, which are hash
values of a hash chain. Each token Wi indicates a certain amount of electricity. Fairness
of the transaction between the EV and the AGG can be guaranteed under the token based
mechanism. During the charging service, the AGG also has continuous monitoring on
EVk’s battery status. EVk periodically collects its battery status information, encrypts it
with a shared symmetric key generated from the pseudonym PSk, and sends the encrypted
message to the AGG. The AGG may adjust the changing parameters based on the battery
status monitoring information.
When the charging service completes, EVk generates the group signature σWLast on the
last token WLast and sends them to the AGG, if EVk expects to terminate the charging
service. After receiving EVk’s group signature σWLast , the AGG generates the signature
SigAGG(WLast) on the last token WLast with its private key, and sends the last token WLast
with both two signatures to the EVA. The EVA checks σWLast and SigAGG(WLast) to ensure
both EVk and the AGG confirm the charging service. Then the AGG traces EVk’s real
identity from the group signature σWLast . Finally, the corresponding electricity fees can be
charged on EVk’s account.
4.2 Proposed PMQC Scheme
In this section, the proposed privacy-preserving multi-quality charging scheme (PMQC) for
secure evaluation and authentication on the EV is formulated in detail. PMQC consists
6 phases: system initialization, service level evaluation, service eligibility authentication,
battery monitoring, bill generation and revocation.
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4.2.1 System Initialization
The EVA generates the key for each EV and AGG in this phase as shown in Figure 4.2.
Initl{} is an arbitrary Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) parameter generator that satisfies
the BDH assumption [56].
 
Figure 4.2: System Initialization in PMQC
• Step-1 : The EVA is given a security parameter ψ to generate the bilinear parameters
{p, g ,G,GT , e} by running Initl{ψ}. g is the generator of group G with large prime
order p. G and GT form a bilinear map e: G × G → GT . The EVA chooses random
exponents α, ε1, ε2 ∈R Z∗p and generates the master key:
MSK = (gα, ε1, ε2) (4.1)
• Step-2 : The EVA chooses random exponents β, γ∈RZ∗p and random group elements
h, q1, q2, · · · , qU∈RG, where q1, q2, · · · , qU are associated with the U attributes in this
system. Then the EVA computes
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f = gβ (4.2)
e˜ = e(g , g)α (4.3)
w = gγ (4.4)
and selects u, v ∈ G to satisfy
uε1 = v ε2 = h (4.5)
The EVA also finds four secure cryptographic hash functions
H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G (4.6)
H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p (4.7)
H3 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}m (4.8)
H4 : Z∗p → {0, 1}m (4.9)
The EVA gets the group signature public key
GPK = (g, w) (4.10)
and finally publishes public key:
PK = (GPK, h, u, v , f , e˜, q1 · · · qU ,H1 · · ·H4) (4.11)
• Step-3 : When the AGG registers itself to the EVA, the AGG generates its pub-
lic/private key pair pubAGG/pvtAGG. The EVA generates and publishes the AGG’s
X.509 certificate on its public key pubAGG for secure channel establishment between
the AGG and EVk. The asymmetric encryption algorithm can be simple RSA algo-
rithm.
• Step-4 : When EVk (k=1,2,. . . ,m) registers itself to the EVA, it presents its identity
IDk to the EVA. Then the EVA allocates attribute set Sk to EVk. The EVA chooses
random exponent tk ∈R Z∗p for EVk. Then it computes
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Dk = g
α+βtk (4.12)
D
′
k = g
tk (4.13)
Dkx = q
tk
x , ∀x ∈ Sk (4.14)
where x indicates one attribute of EVk’s attribute set Sk. Thus, the EVA gets the
group signature private key
GSKk = [λk = H5(Dk),Ak = g
1/(γ+λk)] (4.15)
Here H5 : G → Z∗p is a secure cryptographic hash functions. Finally the EVA loads
the private key SK k into EVk’s non-reproducible physical storage.
SK k = (GSKk,Dk,D
′
k,∀x ∈ Sk : Dkx) (4.16)
4.2.2 Service Level Evaluation
The AGG evaluates EVk’s attributes Sk to determine its service level as shown in Figure
4.3. Secure channel between EVk and the AGG is established first. Then the AGG sends
EVk the challenge chlg , which is generated according to the AGG’s access policy A. By
answering chlg , EVk’s attributes Sk associated with its private key SK k can be evaluated.
Pseudonym Negotiation
EVk and the AGG independently select random exponent a, b ∈R Z∗p. Then EVk and the
AGG exchanges ga and gb to negotiate the Diffie-Hellman sharing secret
gab = (ga)b = (gb)
a
(4.17)
Based on the sharing secret, EVk and the AGG can get the pseudonym
PSk = H4(g
ab) (4.18)
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  Figure 4.3: Service Level Evaluation in PMQC
The AGG associates all the following EVk’s interactions with pseudonym PSk until EVk
checks out.
EVk and the AGG independently select random exponent a, b ∈R Z∗p. Then EVk and the
AGG exchange ga and gb to negotiate the Diffie-Hellman sharing secret gab = (ga)b = (gb)
a
,
and they generate the pseudonym PSk = H4(g
ab). The AGG associates all the interactions
with pseudonym PSk until EVk checks out.
Challenge Generation
The AGG generates the challenge chlg to authenticate EVk’s eligibility, and evaluates EVk’s
attributes Sk based the AGG’s access policy A to determine its service quality. The AGG
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chooses random messages M1,M2∈R{0, 1}∗. Then the AGG performs ciphertext policy
attribute based encryption [2] on M2 to generate ciphertext
CT = Enc{M2,PK , [L, ρ()]} (4.19)
L is a l × n Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes (LSSS) matrix pre-constructed according
to the access policy A. ρ() is the function mapping rows of L to the attributes in Sk. The
AGG first chooses random exponents r1, r2, · · · , rl∈RZ∗p and a random vector
y = [s , y2, y3, · · · , yn ]T∈RZ∗pn (4.20)
Then for j = 1 to l the AGG computes
ϕj = lj · y (4.21)
where vector lj is the jth row of the LSSS matrix L.
The ciphetext CT can be generated:
CT = [C = M2e˜
s ,C
′
= gs , (C1 = f
ϕ1q−r1ρ(1),C
′
1 = g
r1),
· · · , (Cl = f ϕlq−rlρ(l) ,C
′
l = g
rl),L, ρ()]
(4.22)
Then the AGG sends the challenge
chlg = {M1,CT ,TS , SigAGG[H3(M1 ‖ CT ‖ TS )]} (4.23)
to EVk, where TS is the time stamp, SigAGG[H3(M1 ‖ CT ‖ TS )] is the signature
signed by AGG with its private key pvtAGG.
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Challenge Answering
After receiving chlg from the AGG, EVk first verifies its integrity. Then it decrypts the
ciphertext CT . If EVk can successfully decrypt CT in chlg to obtain M2, EVk is able to
have the QGS. Otherwise, EVk can only have the BES. EVk decrypts the ciphertext CT
by the following steps:
• Step-1 :EVk computes the subset Jk ⊆ J satisfying
{ρ(j) : j ∈ Jk} ⊆ Sk (4.24)
where J is the set of row index of matrix L and j indicates the index of jth row in
matrix L. If EVk’s attributes Sk matches the access structure A in matrix L, there
would be a set of constant {ωj ∈ Z∗p : j ∈ Jk} satisfying
∑
j∈Jk
ωj · lj = (1, 0, · · · , 0) (4.25)
Specifically,
∑
j∈Jk
ωj · ϕj =
∑
j∈Jk
ωj · lj · y = (
∑
j∈Jk
ωj · lj) · y = s (4.26)
Otherwise, such set of number does not exist. The ciphertext CT can not be de-
crypted.
• Step-2 :If such set of constant {ωj ∈ Z∗p : j ∈ Jk} can be found, EVk decrypts the
ciphertext CT to obtain M2:
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Cˆ =
e(C
′
,Dk)∏
j∈Jk [e(Cj,D
′
k) · e(C ′j ,Dkρ(j))]ωj
=
e(g , g)αs · e(g , g)sβtk∏
j∈Jk e(g , g)
βϕjωjtk
=
e(g , g)αs · e(g , g)sβtk
e(g , g)βtk
∑
j∈Jk ϕjωj
=
e(g , g)αs · e(g , g)sβtk
e(g , g)sβtk
= e(g , g)αs
(4.27)
M2 = C/Cˆ = M2 · e(g , g)αs/e(g , g)αs (4.28)
4.2.3 Service Eligibility Authentication
After the service level evaluation, EVk responses to the AGG to authenticate itself with
the group signature [49] on the messages M1 and M2 in chlg. If the group signature can
be verified by the AGG, EVk has the eligibility for the charging service. The detail of this
phase is shown in Figure 4.4.
Authentication Answering
EVk generates the group signature on the message M as an authentication answer to the
AGG. The message M for EVk to sign is M = M1 ‖ M2 if CT is decrypted, otherwise it
is M = M1. The group signature can be generated by the following steps:
• Step-1 : EVk chooses random exponents µ, ν, rµ, rν , rλk , rδ1 , rδ2 ∈R Z∗p and computes
δ1 = λkµ (4.29)
δ2 = λkν (4.30)
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 Figure 4.4: Service Eligibility Authentication in PMQC
• Step-2 : EVk computes hash c on message M .
c = H2(M ‖ T1 ‖ T2 ‖ T3 ‖ R1 ‖ R2 ‖ R3 ‖ R4 ‖ R5) (4.31)
T1 = u
µ,T2 = v
ν ,T3 = Akh
µ+ν
R1 = u
rµ ,R2 = v
rν ,R4 = T
rλk
1 · u−rδ1 ,R5 = T
rλk
2 · v−rδ2
R3 = e(T3, g) · e(h,w)−rµ−rν · e(h, g)−rδ1−rδ2
(4.32)
• Step-3 : EVk computes the group signature σ on message M . Then EVk sends it to
the AGG.
σ = (T1,T2,T3, c, tµ, tν , tλk , tδ1 , tδ2) (4.33)
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where tµ = rµ + cµ,tν = rν + cν, tλk = rλk + cλk, tδ1 = rδ1 + cδ1,tδ2 = rδ2 + cδ2.
Authentication Verifying
The AGG verifies the group signature received from EVk. If the group signature on M =
M1 ‖ M2 is verified, EVk can have QGS. If the group signature on M = M1 is verified,
EVk can only have BES. If the group signature is invalid, EVk’s charging service request
should be rejected. The verification steps are below:
• Step-1 :AGG computes:
R˜1 = u
tµ · T−c1 , R˜2 = v tν · T−c2
R˜4 = T
tλk
1 · u tδ1 , R˜5 = T
tλk
2 · v tδ2
(4.34)
R˜3 = e(T3, g)
tλk · e(h,w)−tµ−tν ·
e(h, g)−tδ1−tδ2 · [e(T3,w)/e(g , g)]c
(4.35)
• Step-2 :AGG checks:
c
?
= H2(M ‖ T1 ‖ T2 ‖ T3 ‖ R˜1 ‖ R˜2 ‖ R˜3 ‖ R˜4 ‖ R˜5) (4.36)
4.2.4 Battery Monitoring
After confirming EVk’s service level and eligibility, the AGG provides QGS or BES to
EVk as shown in Figure 4.5, which are both under the AGG’s monitoring. To maintain
the fairness of the transaction between EVk and the AGG, a charging service mechanism
based on hash chain is utilized [57]. EVk takes the multi-quality charging service from the
AGG according to the following steps:
• Step-1 : If the EVk expects KH units of electricity from the AGG, it sends its elec-
tricity demand and its pseudonym {KH,PSk} to the EVA through secure channel.
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Figure 4.5: Multi-Quality Charging in PMQC
• Step-2 : The EVA randomly selects a message WKH ∈ {0, 1}∗. Then it creates a hash
chain, W0,W1, · · · ,WKH , with the hash chain root WKH , which satisfies
Wi = H3(Wi+1), (i = KH − 1, KH − 2, · · · , 0) (4.37)
W0 is the final hash value of the hash chain. Each element Wi can be regarded as
a token, which indicates one unit of electricity during the charging service. After
computing the hash chain, the EVA sends the message {KH,WKH ,W0} to EVk
through secure channel. In addition, the EVA also sends the message {PSk, KH,W0}
to the AGG through secure channel.
• Step-3 : After receiving the message from the EVA, EVk and the AGG independently
generate a shared symmetric key based on the pseudonym PSk at first. EVk restores
the whole hash chain from the root WKH to the final value W0 by computing Wi =
H3(Wi+1), (i = KH − 1, KH − 2, · · · , 0). Then EVk encrypts its current battery
status BS1 and the token W1 into the symmetric ciphertext EPSk(BS1,W1) and
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sends it to the AGG. The AGG verifies the token by comparing the hash value of
the token H3(W1) with W0.
W0
?
= H3(W1) (4.38)
If the token W1 from EVk can be verified, the AGG sets proper charging parameter
according to EVk’s battery status BS1 and provides one unit of electricity to EVk.
• Step-4 : EVk and the AGG repeat the latter part of step-3 with token Wi by verifying
Wi
?
= H3(Wi+1) (4.39)
until EVk finishes all KH units charging or EVk departs before its battery being fully
charged. At the last charging interaction, EVk generates a group signature σWLast
on the token of the last charging interaction WLast. WLast can be WKH or any other
token before WKH . Then EVk sends EPSk(BSLast,WLast, σWLast) as the last charging
request to the AGG.
4.2.5 Bill Generation
After completing the charging service, the EVA generates EVk’s bill and charges the elec-
tricity fees by the following steps:
• Step-1 : The AGG generates a signature SigAGG(WLast) on the last token from EVk
with its private key to indicate its confirmation. Then the AGG sends its signature
SigAGG(WLast), EVk’s group signature σWLast and the last token WLast to the EVA.
• Step-2 : The EVA checks the integrity by verifying both SigAGG(WLast) and σWLast ,
in order to make sure that both AGG and EVk confirm this charging service. Then
the EVA calculates the fees for EVk’s charging service according to its last token
WLast sent to the AGG.
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• Step-3 : The EVA tracks EVk’s real identity from the group signature σWLast by
obtaining Ak in EVk’s group signature private key GSKk. The EVA computes
Ak = T3/(T
ε1
1 · T ε22 ) (4.40)
with the group signature master key GMSK = (ε1, ε2), and tracks its identity IDk
by looking up the user index. Then the EVA charges the electricity fees on IDk’s
account.
4.2.6 Revocation
Each EV or AGG maintains a revocation list
RL = {GSK1, GSK2 · · · , GSKr, date} (4.41)
which includes the revoked EVs’ group signature private keys and the issuing date. If
the EVA wants to revoke EVr+1, EVr+2 · · · , EVr+m, it adds their group signature private
keys and publishes the new
RL′ = {GSK1, GSK2 · · · , GSKr, GSKr+1, GSKr+2 . . . , GSKr+m, date ′} (4.42)
to the public in any necessary time.
Once received the new RL′, the unrevoked EVs and the AGGs update their private
keys and public keys immediately, according to the newly added items in the RL′. EVk
updates its group signature private key GSK k as Algorithm 1:
The AGG updates its group signature public key GPK as Algorithm 2:
A
(i)
k indicates the ith updating for Ak, A
(m)
k is the final output of the algorithms, specif-
ically Ak = A
(0)
k . Such rule also applies to g
(i) and w (i).
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Algorithm 1 EVk’s group signature private key revocation
Input: GSK r+1, . . .GSK r+m,GSK k = (Ak, λk);
Output: GSK
(m)
k = (A
(m)
k , λk);
1: for each i = 1 to m do
2: A
(i)
k =
[A
(i−1)
r+i ]
1/(λk−λr+i)
[A
(i−1)
k ]
1/(λk−λr+i) ;
3: for each j = i+ 1 to m do
4: A
(i)
r+j =
[A
(i−1)
r+i ]
1/(λr+j−λr+i)
[A
(i−1)
r+j ]
1/(λr+j−λr+i) ;
5: end for
6: end for
Algorithm 2 The AGG’s group signature public key revocation
Input: GSK r+1, . . .GSK r+m,GPK = (g ,w);
Output: GPK (m) = (g (m)w (m));
1: for each i = 1 to m do
2: g (i) = A
(i−1)
r+1 ;
3: w (i) = g (i−1) · (Ar+i(i−1))−λr+i ;
4: for each j = i+ 1 to m do
5: A
(i)
r+j =
[A
(i−1)
r+i ]
1/(λr+j−λr+i)
[A
(i−1)
r+j ]
1/(λr+j−λr+i) ;
6: end for
7: end for
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Chapter 5
Security Analysis and Performance
Evaluation
In this chapter, the security analysis on PMQC is performed in Section 5.1. Section 5.2 is
about the performance evaluation on PMQC.
5.1 Security Analysis
Under the trust model defined in Section 3.2, the security properties of PMQC are analyzed
in this section. The security analysis demonstrates that PMQC satisfies all the security
requirements in Section 3.2.
5.1.1 Privacy-Preservation
The real identity and attributes of the EV are kept confidential to the AGG, which provides
the multi-quality charging service to the EVs. Because the full-anonymity is achieved in
the group signature[49], the AGG can check the EV’s service eligibility without knowing
the EV’s real identity by verifying the group signature. All the interactions between the
EV and the AGG are linked to the pseudonym, which is negotiated between the EV and the
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AGG based on the sharing Diffie-Hellman secret. Thus, the real identity of the EV can be
kept secret during all the interactions with the AGG. In addition, the AGG can not obtain
the EV’s attributes during the evaluation, since the attributes are in the EV’s private
key. Furthermore, the EV can confirm its charging bill to the AGG without revealing its
real identity by signing a group signature on it. By opening this group signature with
the group signature master key, the EVA can track the real identity of the EV, which
signs the group signature, and charges corresponding fees for charging service on this EV’s
account. As a result, real identity-hidden fees charging is achieved. Lastly, by hiding EV’s
real identity, the AGG can hardly relate the location of the EV and the battery status
monitoring information with the EV owner. Thus the EV owner’s location and life style
privacy are also preserved.
5.1.2 Fine-grained Access Control
The AGG defines the access policy of the evaluation, builds corresponding LSSS matrix
and generates the challenge. The access policy expressed by the LSSS matrix supports
both “AND” and “OR” gates[2]. The AGG sends a challenge to the EV, which includes
a ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption (CP-ABE) ciphertext generated according
to the access policy, in order to evaluate the EV’s attributes. If and only if the EV’s
attributes in its private key match the AGG’s access policy in the CP-ABE ciphertext
CT , can the EV decrypt the CP-ABE ciphertext and answer the challenge. Thus, the
fine-grained access control on the qualified EVs for QGS is achieved in PMQC.
5.1.3 Traceability
After the charging service, the AGG sends the bill to the EV. The EV generates the group
signature on the bill issued by AGG to indicate its confirmation on the bill. Both AGG and
EVA can check the confirmation by verifying the group signature. In addition, because
the full-traceability is achieved in the group signature[49], the EVA can track the real
identity of the EV by opening the group signature with the group signature master key.
Obtaining the real identity of the EV, corresponding electricity fees can be charged on the
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EV’s account. Also, the EV can hardly deny its electricity fees for the charging service,
because of the non-repudiation achieved by the group signature.
5.1.4 Secure Revocation
The EVA can revoke any EV by publishing its group signature private key to the RL at
any time. The revoked EV loses its service eligibility after the AGG updates the group
signature public key. The unrevoked EVs’ eligibilities are not effected after they update
their group signature private keys. If the revoked EV wants to regain the service eligibility,
it should return to the EVA to re-register. If its re-registering is successful, the EVA
formats the EV’s non-reproducible physical storage and writes a new private key with a
new group signature private key. The EV’s attributes can also be updated during the new
private key issuing process. Because the new group signature private key is unrelated to
the revoked group signature private key, the EV’s identity can be kept confidential when
it regains charging service eligibility.
5.2 Performance Evaluation
In this section, performance evaluation is performed in terms of security feature as well as
computation overhead and communication overhead.
5.2.1 Security Features
Security features are compared among the proposed scheme PMQC, Yang’s scheme and
Liu’s scheme in Table 5.1. All the schemes realize identity-hidden authentication, which
means the EV can be authenticated by AGG without revealing its real identity. Yang’s
scheme and PMQC consider the revocation problem. Yang’s scheme revokes the EV by
simply setting a expiry date. The EV cannot be dynamically revoked at any necessary time.
In contrast, the EVA that manages all the EVs can revoke any EV at any necessary time
in PMQC. Specifically, the EVA publishes the revoked EV’s private key to the revocation
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Table 5.1: Comparison of the Security Features
Liu’s[25] Yang’s[22] PMQC
ID-hidden authentication
√ √ √
Secure Revocation × √ √
Attribute-hidden evaluation × × √
ID-hidden bill generation × × √
list in each AGG or each EV. Once received the new revocation list, the AGG and the
unrevoked EV update their keys. After the update, the revoked EV can no longer have
the charging service eligibility. Any other unrevoked EV’s charging service eligibility is not
effected, its privacy is not violated either. In addition, PMQC realizes attribute-hidden
evaluation and identity-hidden bill generation, which are not achieved in the other two
schemes. Based on the attribute-hidden evaluation, the AGG can determine the charging
service quality to the EV without violating its attribute privacy. The AGG can generate
the EV’s charging service bill for the EVA to charge fees on the EV’s account without
revealing the EV’s real identity.
5.2.2 Computation Overhead
The computation overhead of authentication and verification in PMQC are compared with
that in Yang’s scheme. Compared with the pairing operation, exponentiation operation in
G and exponentiation operation in GT , other operations are negligible[58]. Let TP be the
time for a pairing operation, Te be the time for an exponentiation operation in G, and TeT
be the time for an exponentiation operation in GT .
In the Authentication phase, there are 9 exponentiation operations in GT and 8 pairing
operations in Yang’s scheme, which cost 9TeT + 8TP in total. Even though PMQC has
11 exponentiation operations in G, there are only 1 exponentiation operation in GT and
only 2 time consuming pairing operations. The total computation overhead in PMQC is
11Te + 1TeT + 3TP .
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Table 5.2: Notations in the Computation Overhead Evaluation of PMQC
Symbols Meanings
TP Time for a pairing operation
Te Time for an exponentiation operation in G
TeT Time for an exponentiation operation in GT
In the Verification phase, 5 exponentiation operations in GT and 6 pairing operations
need to be performed in Yang’s scheme, which cost 5TeT + 6TP . In contrast, PMQC has
much less time cost in verification phase, which is 9Te + 3TeT + 2TP .
In addition, the simulations are conducted on a computer with a 3.0 GHz processor
and 1 GB memory under MIRACL library[59]. A pairing operation, an exponentiation
operation in GT and an exponentiation operation in G cost 4.5ms, 2.3ms and 0.6ms.
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 show that PMQC can achieve lower computation overhead for
both authentication and verification.
 
Figure 5.1: Comparison of the Computation Overhead in Authentication
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of the Computation Overhead in Verification
5.2.3 Communication Overhead
Most of the communication overhead in PMQC comes from the AGG’s periodical moni-
toring on the EV’s battery status during charging. The periodical monitoring information
can be carried by a very short message, which is no larger than 100 bytes. The period
of reporting is usually several or tens of seconds[13]. Thus, the communication overhead
between the EV and the AGG in PMQC is very low. Low cost communication techniques
such as WiFi, ZigBee and PLC are suitable for the low communication overhead scenario.
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Chapter 6
Extended Privacy-Preserving
Multi-Quality Charging Scheme in
V2G Network
Based on the proposed PMQC in Chapter 4, the extended privacy-preserving multi-quality
charging (ePMQC) scheme in V2G network is proposed in this chapter. The extended sys-
tem model of ePMQC is defined in Section 6.1. Then each phase of ePMQC is formulated
in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 is about the performance enhancement of ePMQC compared
with PMQC.
6.1 Extended System Model
In PMQC, the AGG evaluates each EV to determine its charging service quality based on
its attributes. However, if the AGG accepts too many EVs for QGS, some problems may
arise.
• First of all, the charging power for the BES EVs varies according to the remaining
power in the AGG after guaranteeing the charging power of all the QGS EVs. The
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total power that the AGG can provide is limited. The more QGS EVs in the AGG,
the less total power can be provided for BES EVs. If too much power in the AGG is
consumed by the QGS EVs, the charging power for the BES EVs may be very low.
Thus, the charging service quality for the BES EVs is seriously effected in such a
scenario. In the worst case, the BES EVs can not have charging service, since all the
power that the AGG can provide is allocated to the large number of QGS EVs.
• Second, besides providing charging service to the EVs, the V2G network should
provide regulation service to the power grid. Due to the unidirectional electricity
flow in the V2G network, the V2G work provides regulation service to the power
grid by adjusting the power that it consumes from the power grid. Specifically, if the
power grid is in electricity shortage during the peak load hours, the V2G network can
reduce its power consumption from the power grid by lowering the power for BES
EVs, in order to reduce the peak load of the power grid. Consequently, the total
power of each AGG in V2G network for charging service should decrease. However,
the capacity of the regulation service that the V2G network can provide is constrained
by the number of QGS EVs under charging. Since the charging power for the QGS
EVs should be guaranteed, the minimum power that the AGG has to consume from
the power grid is the summation of all its QGS EVs’ charging power. The more QGS
EVs are there in the AGG, the higher minimum power the AGG has to consume. If
there are too many QGS EVs in the AGGs, the power that the V2G network consumes
from the power grid can hardly be significantly reduced. Thus, the capacity of the
V2G network to provide regulation service to the power grid is very low.
As a result, the total number of QGS EVs should be strictly controlled in a single
AGG. However, the AGG may be unwilling to limit the number of QGS EVs. The AGG
is belonged to a certain ESP, which is a company trying its best to maximize the profit.
Because the service fee for QGS is much higher than that for BES, the AGG always tries
its best to enroll as many QGS EVs as possible in order to maximize the profit. It is
contradictory that the AGG is willing to control the total number of QGS EVs, which may
reduce the AGG’s profit. To this end, the Independent System Operator (ISO), which is
a non-profit institution with the responsibility to maintain the regulation service capacity
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and the overall stability of the V2G network, is introduced to audit on the EV’s charging
request in order to control the number of QGS EVs in a single AGG. If and only if the EV
provides the permission from the ISO to the AGG and passes the AGG’s evaluation, can
the EV have QGS from the AGG. While maintaining the regulation service capacity and
the overall stability of V2G network, the ISO also relieves the computation overhead on
the EV, which usually has very limited computation capability and storage capacity. The
system model and trust model should be modified due to the introduction of the new entity
ISO. Based on the system model and the trust model of PMQC in Chapter 3, extended
system model for ePMQC is shown in Figure 6.1.
 
Figure 6.1: Extended System Model in ePMQC
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• The responsibility of the ISO is to audit the EV’s charging request. Specifically, the
ISO controls the total number of QGS EVs in a single AGG by issuing permissions
to the EVs that request for charging service. If there are too many EVs in a single
AGG, the ISO may stop issuing permissions to the new incoming EVs for QGS in
that AGG, no matter the EVs pass the AGG’s evaluation or not.
• The ISO is a non-profit institution to maintain the regulation service capacity and
the overall stability of the V2G network. It can hardly obtain any interest from
violating the EV’s privacy. For this reason, the ISO is a semi-trusted entity to both
AGG and EV in the trust model of ePMQC.
6.2 Proposed ePMQC Scheme
There are 7 phases in ePMQC including system initialization, service level evaluation, ser-
vice request auditing, service eligibility authentication, battery monitoring, bill generation
and revocation.
The difference between PMQC and ePMQC is that a service request auditing phase is
added in ePMQC. Specifically, the EVA does not directly send the evaluation challenge
to the EV to evaluate its attributes and determine its service level. Instead, the EVA
sends the evaluation challenge to the ISO for auditing. The ISO audits the EV’s charging
service request by pre-decrypting the CP-ABE ciphertext in the evaluation challenge with
the temperate key received from the EV, which is generated by the EV based on its private
key. The temperate key contains all the EV’s attributes. If the attributes in the temperate
key match the access control policy in the CP-ABE ciphertext in the evaluation challenge,
the ISO can successfully pre-decrypt the CP-ABE ciphertext. If the ISO successfully pre-
decrypts the CP-ABE ciphertext and grants the EV’s request for QGS, a permission with
the pre-decryption result is sent to the EV. Thus, the EV passes the AGG’s evaluation
and the ISO’s auditing to have QGS. On the other hand, if the ISO fails to pre-decrypt
the CP-ABE ciphertext due to the mismatch between the EV’s attributes and the AGG’s
access control policy, or if the ISO prohibits the AGG to accept more QGS EVs, the ISO
sends a permission without the pre-decryption result to the EV. As a result, the EV can
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only have BES. The interactions between the EV , the ISO and the AGG are shown in
Figure 6.2.
 
Figure 6.2: Interactions in ePMQC
6.2.1 System Initialization
The system initialization phase in ePMQC is the same as that in PMQC as shown in
subsection 4.2.1. The EVA generates the master key MSK and keeps it secretly.
MSK = (gα, ε1, ε2) (6.1)
The EVA publishes its public key PK, the AGG’s public key pubAGG with corresponding
X.509 certificate, and the ISO’s public key pubISO.
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GPK = (g, w) (6.2)
PK = (GPK, h, u, v , f , e˜, q1 · · · qU ,H1 · · ·H4) (6.3)
The EVA generates EVk’s private key SKk associated with the attribute set Sk, and
sends it to EVk through secure channel. EVk stores the received private key in its non-
reproducible storage.
GSKk = (λk,Ak) (6.4)
SK k = (GSKk,Dk,D
′
k,∀x ∈ Sk : Dkx) (6.5)
Specifically,
Dk = g
α+βtk (6.6)
D
′
k = g
tk (6.7)
Dkx = q
tk
x ,∀x ∈ Sk (6.8)
6.2.2 Service Level Evaluation
In this phase, the pseudonym PSk is negotiated first between the AGG and EVk to identify
the charging service session. Then, the EVk generates a a temperate key TKk based on
its private key SKk, and sends it with the pseudonym PSk to the ISO for auditing.
Meanwhile, the AGG generates the challenge chlg based on the AGG’s access policy A in
order to evaluate EVk’s attributes for QGS. The AGG also sends the challenge chlg with
the pseudonym PSk to the ISO for auditing.
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Pseudonym and Temperate Key Generation
The EVA and the AGG negotiate the pseudonym in the same way as that in PMQC to
get the pseudonym PSk. Then EVk chooses a random exponent θ ∈R Z∗p and generates a
temperate key TKk based on its private key SKk.
TDk = D
1/θ
k (6.9)
TD
′
k = D
′1/θ
k (6.10)
TDkx = D
′1/θ
kx , ∀x ∈ Sk (6.11)
TK k = (TDk,TD
′
k,∀x ∈ Sk : TDkx) (6.12)
Finally, EVk sends TKk with the pseudonym PSk to the ISO for auditing.
Evaluation Challenge Generation
The AGG generates the evaluation challenge chlg in the same way as that in PMQC, which
is detailedly described in Subsection 4.2.2.
CT = [C = M2e˜
s ,C
′
= gs , (C1 = f
ϕ1q−r1ρ(1),C
′
1 = g
r1),
· · · , (Cl = f ϕlq−rlρ(l) ,C
′
l = g
rl),L, ρ()]
(6.13)
chlg = (M1,CT ,TS , SigAGG{H3(M1 ‖ CT ‖ TS )}) (6.14)
Different from that in PMQC, the AGG does not directly send the challenge chlg to
EVk. Instead, it sends the challenge chlg with the pseudonym PSk to the ISO for auditing.
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6.2.3 Charging Request Auditing
Based on the temperate key TKk from EVk and the evaluation challenge chlg from the AG-
G, the ISO audits EVk’s charging service request under pseudonym PSk by pre-decrypting
the CP-ABE ciphertext in the evaluation challenge chlg with the temperate key TKk.
After receiving the evaluation challenge chlg from the AGG, the ISO checks chlg ’s
integrity by verifying the signature SigAGG{H3(M1 ‖ CT ‖ TS )} inside of chlg . Then
the ISO audits EVk’s charging service request based on the assessment on the resource
condition of the AGG.
• If the ISO allows the AGG to accept more EVs for QGS, it pre-decrypts the CP-ABE
ciphertext CT in chlg with EVk’s temperate key TKk.
Specifically, the ISO computes the subset Jk ⊆ J satisfying
{ρ(j) : j ∈ Jk} ⊆ Sk (6.15)
where J is the set of row index of the LSSS matrix L in CP-ABE ciphertext CT and
j indicates the index of jth row in matrix L.
If the attribute set Sk in the EVk’s temperate key TKk matches the access structure A
described in matrix L, there would be a set of constant {ωj ∈ Z∗p : j ∈ Jk} satisfying∑
j∈Jk
ωj · lj = (1, 0, · · · , 0) (6.16)
Specifically, ∑
j∈Jk
ωj · ϕj =
∑
j∈Jk
ωj · lj · y = (
∑
j∈Jk
ωj · lj) · y = s (6.17)
Then the ISO can pre-decrypt the CP-ABE ciphertext CT and get the pre-decryption
result {C, T Cˆ}.
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T Cˆ =
e(C
′
,TDk)∏
j∈Jk [e(Cj,TD
′
k) · e(C ′j ,TDkρ(j))]ωj
=
e(g , g)αs/θ · e(g , g)sβtk/θ∏
j∈Jk e(g , g)
βϕjωjtk/θ
=
e(g , g)αs/θ · e(g , g)sβtk/θ
e(g , g)(βtk
∑
j∈Jk ϕjωj)/θ
=
e(g , g)αs/θ · e(g , g)sβtk/θ
e(g , g)sβtk/θ
= e(g , g)αs/θ
(6.18)
After successfully pre-decrypting the CP-ABE ciphertext, the ISO sends EVk the
permission pmsn including the pre-decryption result {C, T Cˆ} and the plaintext M1.
pmsn = {M1, C, T Cˆ,TS , SigISO[H3(M1 ‖ C ‖ TCˆ ‖ TS )]} (6.19)
• If the ISO prohibits the AGG to accept more EVs for QGS, or if the attribute set
Sk in the EVk’s temperate key TKk mismatches the access structure A in matrix L,
the ISO sends EVk the permission pmsn, which only includes the plaintext M1.
pmsn = {M1,TS , SigISO[H3(M1 ‖ TS )]} (6.20)
6.2.4 Service Eligibility Authentication
After the charging request auditing, EVk responses to the AGG and authenticates itself
with the group signature [49] on the messages M1 and M2 in chlg. If the group signature
can be verified by AGG, EVk is eligible to have charging service from the AGG.
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Authentication Answering
When EVk receives the permission pmsn from the ISO, it first verifies the signature
SigISO[H3(M1 ‖ TS )] inside pmsn to check the integrity of the received permission pmsn.
• If pmsn = {M1, C, T Cˆ,TS , SigISO[H3(M1 ‖ C ‖ TCˆ ‖ TS )]}, it indicates that the
EVk passes the AGG’s evaluation and the ISO’s auditing. If EVk’s service eligibility
can be authenticated by the AGG, it can have QGS from the AGG.
To pass the AGG’s evaluation, EVk first decrypts the pre-decryption result {C, T Cˆ}
in order to get the message M2.
M2 =
C
TCˆ
θ
=
M2e(g, g)
sα
[e(g, g)sα/θ]
θ
(6.21)
Then EVk generates the group signature σ based on both M1 and M2, and sends it
to the AGG. The detail of the group signature generation is formulated in Subsection
4.2.3.
• If pmsn = {M1,TS , SigISO[H3(M1 ‖ TS )]}, it indicates that the EVk cannot have
QGS from the AGG. The reason for the rejection may be the EVk’s attributes mis-
matching the AGG’s access policy A or the ISO’s limitation on total number of QGS
EVs in the AGG. In such scenario, EVk sends the AGG the group signature σ based
on only M1. The group signature is also generated in the same as that in Subsection
4.2.3.
After generating the group signature σ with the group signature private key GSKk in
the private key SKk, EVk sends it to the EVA for verification.
Answer Verifying
The EVA verifies the group signature σ from EVk with the group signature public key
GPK in the public key PK. If the group signature based on both M1 and M2 is verified,
EVk can have QGS. If the group signature based on M1 is verified, EVk can have BES. If
the group signature verification is failed, the AGG rejects EVk’s charging service request.
The detail for the group signature verification is formulated in Subsection 4.2.3.
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6.2.5 Battery Monitoring
The battery monitoring phase in ePMQC is performed in the same way as that in PMQC.
The detailed description for battery monitoring is in Subsection 4.2.4.
6.2.6 Bill Generation
The bill generation phase of ePMQC is same as that in PMQC shown in Subsection 4.2.5.
6.2.7 Revocation
The revocation phase of ePMQC is same as that in PMQC shown in Subsection 4.2.6.
6.3 Performance Enhancement
While achieving all the security features and security requirements of PMQC, the per-
formance of ePMQC is significantly enhanced compared with PMQC. By introducing the
ISO to pre-decrypt the CP-ABE ciphertext, the EV’s computation overhead and storage
overhead in CP-ABE decryption is dramatically reduced in ePMQC. This is a very attrac-
tive advantage for the EVs, which usually have very limited computation capability and
storage capacity.
6.3.1 The EV’s Computation Overhead
To further investigate the performance enhancement in computation overhead, ePMQC is
compared with PMQC in terms of the EV’s computation overhead in CP-ABE ciphertext
decryption. Same as the assumption in Subsection 5.2.2, only the complex pairing opera-
tion, exponentiation operation in G and exponentiation operation in GT are considered in
the computation overhead evaluation. Let TP be the time for a pairing operation, Te be
the time for an exponentiation operation in G, and TeT be the time for an exponentiation
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operation in GT . The number of attributes satisfying {ρ(j) : j ∈ Jk} ⊆ Sk is defined as
Nattr.
Table 6.1: Notations in the Computation Overhead Evaluation of ePMQC
Symbols Meanings
TP Time for a pairing operation
Te Time for an exponentiation operation in G
TeT Time for an exponentiation operation in GT
Nattr Number of attributes satisfying {ρ(j) : j ∈ Jk} ⊆ Sk
In PMQC, the EV’s computation overhead is linear with the number of attributes Nattr.
By analyzing the decryption steps for the CP-ABE ciphertext in Subsection 4.2.3, the
EV’s computation overhead is TP + (2TP +TeT ) ∗Nattr. In contrast, the EV’s computation
overhead in ePMQC is independent of the number of attributes Nattr. Instead of being
linear with Nattr, the EV’s computation overhead on CP-ABE ciphertext decryption in
ePMQC remains to be the constant TeT all the time. To further demonstrate the reduction
of the EV’s computation overhead, simulations are conducted under the same condition as
that in Subsection 5.2.2. The results are shown in Figure 6.3.
6.3.2 The EV’s Storage Overhead
In PMQC, the EV needs to store its private key SKk, the AGG’s public key pubAGG,
the challenge chlg from the AGG and the generated group signature σ. In ePMQC, the
EV’s private key SKk, the AGG’s public key pubAGG, the ISO’s public key pubISO, the
permission pmsn from the ISO and the generated group signature σ are stored in the EV.
Comparing the EV’s stored items in each scheme shown in Table 6.2, only the unique items
in each scheme are investigated.
According to the definitions of chlg and pmsn in Equation 4.23 and Equation 6.19, the
EV’s storage overhead in PMQC and ePMQC are shown in Table 6.3.
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 Figure 6.3: Comparison of the EV’s Computation Overhead on Decryption
Table 6.2: Items Stored in the EV
Scheme Items Unique Items
PMQC SKk, pubAGG, chlg, σ chlg
ePMQC SKk, pubAGG, pubISO, pmsn, σ pubISO, pmsn
Based on the comparison in Table 6.3, further analysis is performed on the unique
storage overhead in each scheme. l and n are the number of rows and the number of
columns in the LSSS Matrix L. |Z∗p| is the size of a number in Z∗p, which is a multiplicative
integer group under multiplication modulo p. |G| is the size of one element in multiplicative
cyclic groups G. |GT | is the size of one element in multiplicative cyclic groups GT .
The detail of the storage overhead in PQMC and ePMQC are shown below:
• PMQC:
|CT | = (2l + 1) ∗ |G|+ |GT |+ l ∗ n ∗ |Z∗p| (6.22)
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Table 6.3: Comparison of the EV’s Storage Overhead
Scheme Storage Overhead Unique Overhead
PMQC |M1|+ |CT |+ |TS|+ |SigAGG| |CT |
ePMQC |M1|+ |C|+ |+ |TCˆ|+ |TS|+ |SigISO|+ |pubISO| |C|, |TCˆ|,|pubISO|
• ePMQC:
|C|+ |TCˆ|+ |pubISO| = 2 ∗ |GT |+ |pubISO| (6.23)
Table 6.4: Notations in the Storage Overhead Evaluation of ePMQC
Symbols Meanings
|Z∗p| The size of a number in Z∗p
|G| The size of an element in group G
|GT | The size of an element in group GT
l The number of rows in the LSSS Matrix L
n The number of columns in the LSSS Matrix L
Specifically, the simulations on the EV’s storage overhead are preformed under the
group element size definition in Miracl Crypto Sdk [59]. |Z∗p| is 1024 bits, |G| is 160 bits,
|GT | is 960 bits. The public key pubISO is a RSA public key with a length of 1024 bits.
Based on the conditions declared above, simulation results are shown in Figure 6.4 and
Figure 6.5. While the EV’s storage overhead in PMQC going up with the increase in rows
number and columns number of LSSS Matrix L, the EV’s storage overhead in ePMQC
remains to be constant.
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 Figure 6.4: The EV’s Storage Overhead in PMQC
 
Figure 6.5: The EV’s Storage Overhead in ePMQC
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
Recently, vehicle-to-grid (V2G) network attracts more and more attentions from both in-
dustries and academias due to its considerable environmental merits and economical ben-
efits. However, the privacy-preservation concern is a major obstacle which makes people
reluctant to join in the V2G network. In addition, the charging service with single service
quality can hardly meet the market demand on diverse levels of charging services. In this
thesis, a privacy-preserving multi-quality charging (PMQC) scheme for V2G network is
proposed to offer the electric vehicle (EV) quality-guaranteed service (QGS) or best ef-
fort service (BES) without violating its privacy. Specifically, PMQC protects the EV’s
privacy, such as real identity, attributes, location and lifestyle, through identity-hidden au-
thentication, attribute-hidden evaluation and anonymous bill generation. Security analysis
demonstrates that the PMQC achieves the security requirements on privacy-preservation,
fine-grained access control, traceability and secure revocation. Performance evaluation
shows that PMQC can authenticate the EV with lower computation overhead compared
with other schemes in V2G network. Based on PMQC, the extended privacy-preserving
multi-quality charging (ePMQC) scheme can maintain the overall stability of V2G network
and capacity of the regulation service provided by V2G network, by introducing the In-
dependent System Organization (ISO) to audit the EV’s charging service request. While
satisfying all the security features and security requirements of PMQC, ePMQC achieves
a significant reduction in the EV’s computation overhead and storage overhead. In the
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future, the following two aspects are expected to be explored:
• Both PMQC and ePMQC in this thesis focus on the privacy preserving issues. The
security model is based on the assumption that all entities are honest but curious. In
the future, privacy-preservation concerns under weaker security assumptions should
be considered.
• The revocations in the proposed schemes only involve the EV’s charging service
eligibility. In the future, the efficient method to simultaneously revoke the EV’s
eligibility and attributes should be explored.
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